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Resumen
Partiendo de los conceptos de 
trascendencia en Edmund Husserl 
y Martin Heidegger, el artículo 
investiga el significado del mismo 
concepto en la filosofía de María 
Zambrano, a través de su libro 
La Confesión: género literario. A 
partir de esta investigación pretende 
desarrollar un concepto de transcen-
dere. Este último concepto implica 
una interpretación específica de la 
filosofía del «ser» en María Zambra-
no, en que consta una importante 
conexión a las teorías políticas de la 
misma autora mediante un impe-
rativo ético. El artículo se centra en 
las divergentes construcciones de 
diferencia en Husserl, Heidegger 
y Zambrano. Intenta localizar la 
posición desde la cual trascendencia 
es posible en los tres autores y las 
cualidades o funciones que tiene la 
misma posición; la más importante 
de ellas la dirección del movimiento 
transcendiendo.
Palabras clave
Trascendencia, diferencia onto-
lógica, epoché, tiempo, Zam-
brano.
Abstract
The article develops an investi-
gation of the concept of trans-
cendere, around the concepts of 
transcendence in Husserl, Hei-
degger and specifically in María 
Zambrano’s book La Confesión: 
género literario. The author sug-
gests that a concept of transcendere 
can be constructed on the basis of 
such fundamental notions as di-
fference, movement and direction. 
The article goes on to argue that 
these notions create the conditions 
for an ontology that cannot be 
separated from ethics. The concept 
of transcendere may serve as a brid-
ge between political and ontolo-
gical thinking; the article suggests 
that this is the case in the thinking 
of María Zambrano.
Keywords
Transcendence, Ontological diffe-
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It is striking, when reading one of Zambrano’s early books such as 
La Confesión: género literario (1943),1 that she developed her 
philosophy in close relation to the phenomenological discussion.2 
Even more so, it is possible to read La Confesión as an explicit 
response to a debate which took place between several successors 
to Husserl – among others, Max Scheler and Edith Stein – and, 
maybe most importantly, Heidegger. It’s possible, through La 
Confesión, to situate Zambrano directly in the debate on the 
problems caused by the notion of phenomenological epoché and 
the transcendental subject in Husserl. Furthermore, that debate 
could be considered one of the important arenas in which Zam-
brano situated her first investigations. I will argue that Zambrano 
develops her own philosophical answer in a phenomenological 
discussion of this kind. The answer is developed in terms of a 
transcending function – Zambrano defines transcendence in 
various ways, as for example «opening way»,3 or «going out of 
oneself»4 – which I will call transcendere5 Starting with the formu-
lation of a problem in Husserl, I will go on to discuss the develop-
ment of an answer to the problem at the crossroads between the 
thinking of Zambrano and Heidegger. 
At the outset one can mention two different concepts of transcend-
ence, found in Husserl.6 Both of them have to do with the relation-
ship between the subject’s consciousness and the objects of that 
consciousness. Husserl defined being as that which is posited, 
something that implies an a priori action of positioning. The 
phenomenological reduction that Husserl introduced, which we can 
understand as a form of positioning, converts entities into objects or 
phenomena. And since epoché in Husserl is an intellectual action  
or attitude it follows that the object that is, is in relation to a 
consciousness that posits it. 7 Since the positioning consciousness 
itself, in order for it to be, needs to be at the same time posited and 
performing the positioning, the question of the positioning of 
consciousness itself is raised. The consciousness becomes its own 
ultimate ground in this line of reasoning, at the same time both 
object and subject of its own positioning. 
Husserl argues that entities as whole objects only become present to 
the subject’s consciousness through a stream of perceptions in every 
one of which they are never fully present.8 In other words, the 
objects become complete only after a uniting of various perceptions 
in the subject’s consciousness. The concept of transcendence corre-
sponds to this structure with its double meaning: a) Concerning the 
transcendental subject, transcendence as that function by which  
the consciousness is complete as the centre from which the percep-
tions are united, and as such not subjectable to reduction: or, put 
another way, the consciousness as transcendent in relation to its own 
stream of perceptions.9 b) The position of the entities to the extent 
that they are beyond the subject’s consciousness: that is to say, that it 
is only after the reduction that they are present as objects, and 
1. Zambrano, M., La Confesión: género 
literario, Madrid, Siruela, 1995 (published for 
the first time in 1943 with the title La 
Confesión: género literario y método) In the 
following: La Confesión
2. Zambrano mentions Heidegger only once 
in La Confesión (pág. 23), faithful to her 
custom of providing few references (though 
they are more common in later books and 
articles). In Los Sueños y el Tiempo, for 
example, written in the form of separate 
articles during the 1950s but published as a 
book in 1992, she explicitly places her 
investigation of time and sleep in relation to 
the question of epoché in Husserl. Probably, 
in La Confesión she already had this 
discussion as a reference. A cursory look at 
the headings in La Confesión directly places 
the book in a phenomenological language, 
with subtitles such as «action» and 
»evidence.» It is also telling that the only 
mention of Heidegger in La Confesión is in 
relation to idealism. Zambrano accuses 
Heidegger of being an heir to idealism and, 
against him, stresses the necessity of 
transforming the idealistic subject. She also 
writes that confession must be understood as 
a protest against the subject that German 
idealism rediscovered. »Es también el Yo 
transcendental que vuelve a descubrir el 
idealismo alemán, la unidad única del sujeto 
del conocimiento que pone el pensar; con el 
ser, pues unidad él mismo, pone la unidad 
del sujeto.» La Confesión, ed. cit., págs. 92-93
3. Ibid. pág. 16
4. Ibid. pág. 37
5. Jonna Bornemark uses the concept of 
transcendere in the meaning of crossing 
borders, in her thesis Kunskapens gräns, 
gränsens vetande, Södertörn Philosophical 
Studies 6, Stockholm, 2009. Even though I 
follow her thesis to some extent, especially in 
the exposition of the concept of transcenden-
ce in Husserl, it is important to point out 
that the concept of transcendere, as suggested 
here, does not take on the same meaning as it 
does in Bornemark. This article can to some 
extent be considered an attempt to discuss 
the further possible meanings of the concept 
found in Bornemark.
6. See the excellent exposition by Jonna 
Bornemark in Kunskapens gräns, gränsens 
vetande, págs. 51-69
7. Husserl, E., Ideer till en ren fenomenologi 
och ren feomenologisk undersökning, § 142, 
Thales, Stockholm, 2004 (Ideen zu einer 
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologis-
chen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine 
Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie,  
§ 142)
8. Ibid., § 41, 44, 143
9. Ibid. § 57
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conceivable to the consciousness through a never «full» stream of 
perceptions.10 
The structure raises at least two important questions. i) How can a 
pure consciousness have knowledge of objects that are essentially 
different, i.e. not reducible to objects in a stream of perceptions? 
And ii) how are we to understand our own experience of conscious-
ness as a whole if it is not as an object to that same consciousness? It 
is possible to find attempts to answer both questions in Husserl, but 
we will leave them aside for the time being and let the reasoning in 
Husserl serve as the starting-point of the discussion between 
Heidegger and Zambrano. 
The first concept of transcendence in Husserl (concerning the 
transcendental subject) has at least two important traits. It is on the 
one hand an ontological ground that exists in and for itself, and on 
the other hand the foundational «without which» the presence  
of the objects would be impossible. The second concept of tran-
scendence presents a problem in relation to the first one that has to 
do with a radical difference between the transcendent parties. 
Consciousness and entity are defined as radically different or beyond 
each other, which questions the very act of transcending – and 
therefore the possibility of knowledge. Paradoxically, the interpreta-
tion of transcendence in Husserl converts the concept into a limit-
concept which focuses its attention on the two sides of the limit, 
rather than on the transcending movement that transgresses the 
limit. Transcendence can be said to tend towards transcendental 
positions rather than towards transcending movements in Husserl. 
I would like to suggest that as an answer to this problem in Husserl, 
both Heidegger and Zambrano develop structures – albeit with 
somewhat different contents – that instead focus on the transcend-
ing movement. The concept of transcendere can be understood as the 
interpretation of these structures. The Latin verb transcendere that 
will be discussed in what follows has two important traits. It implies 
action or movement but it also underlines – being both infinitive 
and imperative – a fundamental difference between the transcending 
movements in Heidegger and Zambrano: that of the direction of the 
movement, and the ethical conclusions drawn from it. 
Time, or temporality, is crucial for the understanding of the concept 
of transcendence in Heidegger and, dare I suggest, in Zambrano.11 
Dasein could be understood as that being which temporalizes itself 
in actions with the fundamental ontological structure of care 
(Sorge).12 Without going into a detailed description of the concepts 
in Heidegger I would like to argue that it is possible to interpret 
confession, as presented in La Confesión by Zambrano, as a specific 
temporalization of a subject-being. In this temporalization, confes-
sion plays the role of a fundamental ontological structure.13 
10. Ibid. § 42
11. Zambrano articulates the relation 
between the concept of transcendence and 
time in various places. In the unpublished 
text, «El tiempo apariencia,» M-462 from 
1956, she explicitly state sthat her own 
conception of both concepts should be 
considered a critique of Heidegger. 
12. This is how, for example, Alexei 
Chernyakov understands Dasein in his The 
ontology of time – Being and Time in the 
Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 
2002, págs. 115-117 and 218-219.
13. Not the only fundamental ontological 
structure, would I suggest. At the beginning 
of La Confesión (pág. 25) Zambrano states 
that the different genres correspond to 
different structures and necessities of life, of 
which the most important and equal to all is 
the necessity to express itself.
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For Heidegger, Dasein is that being that is constantly submerged in 
action and interpretation so as to be able to act. In this action the 
entities become being-to-hand. Dasein temporalizes itself in dealing 
with things according to a primordial structure of care, which is the 
name Heidegger gives to the fundamental structure of any action 
and interpretation of Dasein.14 Within the frames of the actions that 
Dasein performs the entities become being-to-hand in relation to 
the complex of other things being-to-hand and in relation to a 
specific way of acting of Dasein. Dasein casts itself on the entities as 
possibilities in the future and this is the fundamental structure of its 
being.15 Dasein casting itself towards itself through the mediation 
of the being-to-hand as possibilities in the future can be understood 
as the constitutive elements of the concept of transcendence  
in Heidegger.16 Transcendence can be interpreted as ontological in 
Heidegger since transcendence takes on the meaning of the move-
ment with which Dasein «steps over itself,» which is equivalent to 
the movement of being as far as it is being-in-the-world: for, accord-
ing to Heidegger, being-in-the-world is a structure that constantly 
steps over itself.17 
Even so, a primary interpretation and «seeing» explains how the 
entities can be perceived as being-to-hand for Dasein to cast itself 
on, and the structure of care becomes visible in the actions with 
which Dasein is.18 The kind of difference that makes a concept of 
transcendence possible in Heidegger does not seem to be the same 
as in Husserl. For Heidegger the difference does not lie between 
transcendental positions or qualities, but is instead constituted by 
and in a movement and its direction towards, as ontological differ-
ence.19 It has been suggested that the ontology of Dasein could be 
understood as a topology;20 this image is telling because it lets us see 
how Dasein’s movement of casting or caring involvement in the 
direction of the future implies another direction in which Dasein as 
movement or action – the being of its beings – is shown. Ontologi-
cal difference does not lie before the transcending movement but is 
the result of that same movement and it is constituted by what we 
could understand as a changed perspective – what we have called 
direction – towards Dasein itself. 
The concept of transcendence in Heidegger serves our purpose of 
searching for a concept of transcendere in two ways. First of all it 
shows how transcendence can be thought of as primarily movement 
not presupposing entity. Secondly it gives us the opportunity to ask 
whether transcendence understood as entity’s being in its direction 
towards itself and with the movement predicated by the structure of 
its own being can really be understood as transcendence in the sense 
of «going beyond».
Zambrano criticises the conception of being as a being with direc-
tion towards itself in La Confesión, stating that Heidegger is only an 
heir to German idealism.21 For Zambrano the non-existent radical 
14. Ibid. págs. 78-86 § 12
15. Heidegger, M., Varat och Tiden - 1, 
Daidalos, Doxa Press, Lund, 1992, pág. 192, 
subsection 148 (Sein und Zeit, subsection 148)
16. Alexei Chernyakov writes in his The 
ontology of time (págs. 173-176) that the 
concept of Sorge in Heidegger can be unders-
tood as the heir to the transcendental subject 
in the sense of being that fundamental 
ground which is only to itself, or Dasein as 
the only being for which the question of 
being can be a question. To us, this seems to 
make an important difference: Sorge can only 
be considered a fundamental ground of 
Dasein in the sense that it is the relation with 
which entities draw Dasein into being as a 
particular structure of activity. 
17. Heidegger, M., The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, Indiana University Press, 
Indianapolis, 1988, 425 (Die Grundprobleme 
der Phänomenologie, 425)
18. Heidegger, M., Varat och Tiden – 1, págs. 
107-114 § 17, subsections 77-83 (Sein und 
Zeit, subsections77-83) and págs. 193-199 
§ 32, subsections 148-153 (Sein und Zeit, 
subsections 148-153)
19. Ibid. pág. 197, subsection 151 (Sein und 
Zeit, subsection 151)
20. Chernyakov, A., The ontology of time, ed. 
cit., pág. 196
21. Zambrano, M., La Confesión, ed. cit., 
pág. 23
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other in the philosophy of Heidegger is a problem and that is why 
the subject that emerges from the confession does so by an action 
which is at the same time the reduction of the heart and a direction 
towards the other.22 We shall presently see what this means. As a 
starting-point I want to suggest that this radical other in Zambrano 
should not be understood as ontological difference in the sense of 
Heidegger, nor as difference in the meaning of the transcendental 
ideal subject and its objects. This permits the object in Zambrano to 
be at the same time other and recognisable, at the same time object 
of knowledge and present as non-reducible other. And within the 
conditions of this third difference the fundamental direction to-
wards the other becomes a fundamental ethical imperative – tran-
scendere! – with political and ethical implications.
As in Heidegger, the confession described by Zambrano is struc-
tured around a directed movement.
»Mas también se manifiesta en la Confesión el caracter fragmentario de 
toda vida, el que todo hombre se sienta a sí mismo como trozo incom-
pleto, esbozo nada más; trozo de si mismo, fragmento. Y al salir, busca 
abrir sus límites, trasponerlos y encontrar, más allá de ellos, su unidad 
acabada. Espera, como el que se queja, ser escuchado; espera que al 
expresar su tiempo se cierre su figura; adquirir, por fin, la integridad 
que le falta, su total figura.»
23
»La acción ha sido descubierta, en suma, sobre la caridad, sobre la vida 
trascendiendo hacía el prójimo y recibida por la de él, que salía también 
a buscarlos. Única acción verdadera, que por eso se llama ’vocación’, 
porque es llamada, y no solo desde lo alto, sino desde los lados; llamada 
de los prójimos nuestros hermanos.»
24
Confession starts with the feeling of being dispersed and lost in the 
multitude of creatures, feelings that incite a turning towards some-
thing that we cannot see but that we believe to be there. We believe 
that something is there because we see a sign of it, its appearance or 
its symbol or name. Just as Augustine, in his Confessions, calls out 
– Oh God! – in the hope of being heard, confession involves a first 
recognition, and interpretation of something being there. And just 
as God’s name, according to Augustine, must be understood as a 
sign of his presence in the midst of fragmentation, so must the other 
also be interpreted in his appearance as a sign or symbol of his 
presence.25 In this sense the experience of the other can never be 
direct, but must be understood as an expression of a present radical 
other who cannot be seen in any other way than by his appearance 
as symbol. We recognize the other as a symbol or as a point of 
direction in the confession, because we believe and hope that 
something is there. And paradoxically, the direction of the tran-
scending movement is my own unity with something that is at once 
outside and inside myself. «Y al salir, busca abrir sus límites, 
trasponerlos y encontrar, más allá de ellos, su unidad acabada.»26 
22. Ibid. págs. 31, 98-100
23. Ibid. pág. 37
24. Ibid. págs. 56-57
25. St. Augustine, Confessions, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York, 
2008, pág. 5 (book I, v)
26. Zambrano, M., La Confesión, ed. cit., 
pág. 37
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The transcending movement consists in a direction towards the 
other that is a direction towards myself (as is also the case with 
Dasein) but without losing the other as other. 
In Zambrano, difference in the relationship between the other and 
me is based not on knowledge or direct experience but on recogniz-
ability and a primordial act of accepting.27 Zambrano discusses this 
acceptance in terms of the reduction of the heart, which consists in 
leaving oneself open and in oblivion, so as to let the other show 
itself.28 The confession is described by Zambrano as a movement 
towards the other through confessing one’s existence, in the literal 
sense of Dasein as being-here or -there. The confession declares:  
I am here and I believe that you are there! The temporalization of a 
subject-being in Zambrano’s La Confesión does not begin with 
turning towards something and inserting it in ones self-progression, 
but with a double declaration of presence, without yet having filled 
that presence with content: «...sobre la vida trascendiendo hacía el 
prójimo y recibida por la de él, que salía también a buscarlos.»29
In this somewhat displaced interpretation of Dasein – as a move-
ment, but not solely my own progression towards myself – being’s 
basic structure entails two equally present parties with the same 
capability to express themselves. Both parties are in the process of 
expression, both in the process of transgression and transcending. 
Being must then be understood as the unity of two things that are 
radically different, but not ontologically or essentially different (in 
which case the other could not be recognized as the same in the 
sense of being-there), which become a unit because of their direc-
tion towards each other. In this way the product of the transcending 
movement towards the other is in one sense being of the confessor 
himself, but in another sense himself as somebody other: a new unit 
and the only one possible, in unity with another. 
This unity with the other, which Zambrano describes as a point of 
identification or a centre, is really the only subject-being we can talk 
about, since the confessor started out in dispersion and fragmenta-
tion.30 And it is only through a continuous process of transcending 
and unity with the other that time and with it the subject as a whole 
becomes possible. In the confession Husserl’s idea of the transcenden-
tal ideal subject could be said to have been turned inside out. Looked 
upon from the perspective of the experience of time created in the 
transcending movement towards the other, it is not the object but the 
subject that becomes whole in a stream of perceptions, through its 
own moving towards the other, with the other, in the other; not 
self-reflection, but recognizing the other as I let him see me. 
In Heidegger the epoché can be said to have been turned into the 
reduction of the presupposition of the subject. And in Zambrano 
the reduction of the heart must be understood as that reduction 
with which the confession brackets appearances and fragmented 
27. Ibid. pág. 41
28. Ibid. págs. 44-51, 78-79
29. Ibid. pág. 57
30. Ibid. págs. 40, 62-63
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being by recognizing them in order to reach a being in unity with 
them. It is with another that the confession creates unity, not with a 
subject-being’s self nor with objects or tools, and it does so as a 
specific temporalization in direction of the other. However the unity 
is frail and only momentary, and needs to be repeated continuously; 
according to Zambrano, the subject needs to be reborn.31 
According to this description, confession must be considered 
a-temporal,32 a function rather than an actual process in time, 
repeated in the moment of confessing. But confession also has a 
close connection to time. Dasein temporalized itself through its 
actions towards the possibilities created in the meanings of the 
being-at-hand as a future. Since Dasein as the being of beings is only 
the product of those actions, it must always be understood as 
existing within temporality. But confession temporalizes the confes-
sional subject differently. In time it is not primarily in the future 
that the confessional subject becomes, but through memory and rec-
ognition. With the same movement that directs and leads the 
confessional subject in its becoming with the other, time emerges as 
the recollection of a former unity.33 Time is then to be considered 
the product of the confession, and the moment in which the 
confession takes place a-temporal.34 Or in terms of the ontological 
difference: the confessional moment is the temporality of time and 
the transcending movement a temporalization.35 
The notion of time in La Confesión suggests several things of impor-
tance for the concept of transcendere that we started out looking for. 
Firstly, the moment of the confession, in which a transcending 
movement towards the other takes place, is temporalization as such 
and must therefore be conceived as a-temporal. Secondly and on the 
other hand, confession is movement, and it can only be so if time is 
created in that same movement. This means that the confessional 
movement can be understood much like the nunc stans from which 
the first mover in Aristotle moves the world and creates it. Or as a 
moment within another movement from which the movement as 
such springs, only to disclose retrospectively the original movement in 
which the moment was part. In fact, since the moment of the confes-
sion cannot be movement without also being time, it constantly lapses 
into temporality. The confession can then be considered a constant 
tension between timely differences. On the one hand the other as 
other in time and on the other hand a confessional moment in which 
nothing is but fragmentation. Confession, as temporalization, creates 
difference while it creates unity as an a-temporal moment.
Such a double creation can only be possible if we understand the 
movement towards the other as a movement of transcendere that 
transposes, as Zambrano writes in the citation above, not only the 
limits of the subject-being but the metaphysical position of the 
other into an ontological position. The movement of transcendere is 
a movement crossing the limit of time and it can only do so if the 
31. Ibid. pág. 23
32. We can find the notion of a-temporality 
and supra-temporality in Los Sueños y el 
Tiempo. Both temporalities correspond to 
that part of the subject-being that Zambrano 
names the «I». 
33. Zambrano, M., La Confesión, ed. cit., 
págs. 30
34. Ibid. pág. 27 What I call the moment of 
confession should not be confused with the 
fact that confession always starts from the 
experience of lived time. This is why 
confession can be seen as temporalization; 
the moment of confession performs a 
continuous temporalization into time. 
35. Inevitably the question is raised of 
whether or not there are different kinds of 
temporalization in Zambrano. I believe that 
several temporalizations are suggested in Los 
Sueños y el Tiempo. In La Confesión, 
Zambrano speaks of different literary genres 
that can lead to different kinds of knowledge, 
for example the Guide and Poetry. 
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radical other is considered an «immanent» ontological position, as a 
symbol or indication of direction. But most importantly, confession 
as a movement of transcendere implies yet another direction in our 
topology. Zambrano writes:
En realidad son dos los modos de unidad que los filósofos concibieron 
para el ser humano: ésta de la identidad del ser en su forma pura 
inteligible, identidad de la idea, y la unidad de armonía de los estoicos; 
unidad de medida casi musical, en que la actividad es incesante para 
mantener la inmovilidad aparente.
36
Zambrano is speaking about the confessional subject, what we could 
call the becoming of being through the temporalizing actions of the 
confession. If confession can be understood as a moment, a «birth» 
if one will,37 that needs to be constantly repeated in order for the 
unity to exist, then the repeated confessions must be understood  
as yet another stream or movement. The repeated moments of confes-
sion can in themselves be considered a stream where every confession 
is a moment within a movement. Transcending itself through its 
repeated incarnations this second movement must be considered 
supra-temporal. The direction of this second movement of repeated 
confessions is not towards the other. It moves towards nothingness 
– «la nada» – and this nothingness could possibly be considered 
metaphysical. Even so, this second movement is a fundamental part of 
the concept of transcendere that we want to outline in Zambrano. As 
the movement of the repeated confessions it constitutes the basis of 
the possibility of any being as such. The relationship between the two 
movements implied in the concept of transcendere could possibly be 
described as the difference between metaphysics and ontology. But 
considering their inevitable dependence it would be equally true to 
say that they raise doubts about that very difference. 
As a conclusion, the movement of transcendere – which from the 
perspective of the temporalized subject-being is a point of identifica-
tion – creates its own concept of difference. This is because the 
fundamental difference that makes transcendere possible is to be found 
between one direction and another in the transcending movements 
that form life. The difference conceived of in Zambrano allows for an 
ontological space which is from the beginning intimate, and ethical 
and which does not allow for self-identification. The confessional 
subject-being can then be understood as opposed to Dasein, as well as 
the transcendental subject who Zambrano claims to be fundamentally 
alone. In this intimate room, or point of identification unity the 
imperative side of transcendere becomes highlighted. And it is precisely 
here that I would like to suggest that Zambrano connects her political 
and philosophical thinking. In Zambrano, ethics and politics are 
connected to the fundamental question of being, through an impera-
tive saying: In order for me to transcend in the direction of the other 
(i.e. to become) I must show myself. And by doing so I can let the 
other be seen, or allow him to be present. 
36. Zambrano, M., La Confesión, ed. cit., 
pág. 63.
37. Ibid. pág. 23.
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